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IT’S SCANDALOUS! – LIMITING PROFANE
TRADEMARK REGISTRATIONS AFTER TAM AND

BRUNETTI
By Gary Myers1
“Scandal is gossip made tedious by morality.”
― Oscar Wilde, Lady Windermere’s Fan
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INTRODUCTION

Over the course of the last two years, the Supreme Court has engaged in a
long-overdue assessment of the constitutionality of federal trademark law
prohibitions on the registration of offensive marks. In its unanimous 2017
decision in Matal v. Tam,2 the Court held that the disparagement clause is a
content-based provision that violates the First Amendment. In 2019, the Court
in Iancu v. Brunetti3 held that the refusal to register the mark “FUCT” on grounds
that it was immoral or scandalous would also violate the First Amendment.4
These cases offered an opportunity for the Court to clarify the proper role of
free speech analysis in the context of the federal trademark registration system.
The central holding of both cases is that content-based prohibitions related to
the viewpoint or message conveyed by a trademark cannot be precluded from
registration.5
In light of Tam and Brunetti, the Lanham Act’s provision precluding
registration of any disparaging, scandalous, or immoral mark is invalid and
unenforceable. This leaves the government with no statutory basis for refusing
to register marks containing vulgar, profane, or obscene words and images. The
question going forward, however, is whether these landmark cases would
nevertheless leave open an opportunity for Congress to draft a new, more
narrowly tailored prohibition on marks that would not present the same breadth
of First Amendment concerns. Thus, this article explores whether a statute
(along with implementing regulations) precluding the registration of vulgar,
profane, and obscene marks might be drafted such that it constitutes a
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral restriction on speech.
II.

THE LANHAM ACT PROHIBITIONS AND THE GAME-CHANGING
RULING IN TAM

The Lanham Act, which governs federal protection for trademarks, was
passed to protect the purchasing public by providing accurate information about
the source of goods and services,6 protect trademark owners who make

137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).
4 Id. at 2297.
5 See Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744; Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294.
6 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782 n.15 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (The Lanham Act allows purchasers to “be confident that, in purchasing a product
bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks
for and wants to get.”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946)).
2
3
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investments in the goodwill of their brands,7 and establish a nationwide system
for the registration and protection of marks.
Section 2 of the Lanham Act identifies which trademarks can be registered
on the principal register and which were intended to be barred from federal
registration. It states:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused
registration on the principal register on account of its nature
unless it—
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or
scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or
falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or
dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring
them into contempt, or disrepute; or a geographical
indication which, when used on or in connection with
wines or spirits, identifies a place other than the origin
of the goods and is first used on or in connection with
wines or spirits by the applicant on or after one year
after the date on which the WTO Agreement (as
defined in section 3501(9) of title 19) enters into force
with respect to the United States.8
For many years, trademark owners and practitioners endured the inconsistent
and often arbitrary enforcement of these prohibitions, which were finally
challenged by Simon Tam and his Asian–American dance-rock band in the nowfamous case of Matal v. Tam.9 The group decided to name themselves, and adopt
as a brand, “The Slants.”10 Their express purpose was to “reclaim” and “take
ownership” of Asian stereotypes and childhood slurs by making use of this term
in a positive, affirmative way.11 When the group sought federal registration for

7 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.14 (1982) (“By applying a
trademark to goods produced by one other than the trademark’s owner, the infringer deprives
the owner of the goodwill which he spent energy, time, and money to obtain. At the same
time, the infringer deprives consumers of their ability to distinguish among the goods of
competing manufacturers.”) (citing S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 3 (2d Sess. 1946); H.R. Rep. No.
76-944, at 3 (1st Sess. 1939)).
8 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012).
9 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
10 Id. at 1754.
11 Id.
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this mark, the trademark examiner refused to register it, deeming it disparaging
to persons of Asian descent.12
After unsuccessful appeals to the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board and the
Federal Circuit, Tam prevailed at the Federal Circuit13 en banc and eventually
reached the Supreme Court. Writing a unanimous opinion on this point, Justice
Alito struck down the prohibition on disparaging marks: “We now hold that this
provision violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It offends a
bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground
that it expresses ideas that offend.”14 The Court rejected the argument that the
restriction was government speech, finding that it denied the important benefits
of federal registration based on the content and viewpoint expressed by the
trademark owner.15 The justices were split on whether to address other issues in
the case, but all agreed with this fundamental proposition.16 Justice Kennedy,
writing for himself and three other justices, noted in his concurrence “that the
viewpoint discrimination rationale renders unnecessary any extended treatment
of other questions raised by the parties.”17
III.

THE BRUNETTI DECISION

Unlike the unanimous ruling in Matal v. Tam, the Court in Brunetti was divided
on one of the two key issues. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court,
joined by Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. The
opening paragraph summarizes the history and ruling succinctly:
Two Terms ago, in Matal v. Tam, this Court invalidated the
Lanham Act’s bar on the registration of “disparag[ing]”
trademarks. Although split between two non-majority opinions,
all Members of the Court agreed that the provision violated the
First Amendment because it discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint. Today we consider a First Amendment challenge to a
neighboring provision of the Act, prohibiting the registration of
“immoral[] or scandalous” trademarks. We hold that this

Id.
In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
14 Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
15 Id. at 1753, 1758-60.
16 Id. at 1750.
17 Id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J. concurring). For commentary on the issues in the Matal case, see
Gary Myers, Trademarks & The First Amendment After Matal v. Tam, 26 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67,
85 (2018); Rebecca Tushnet, The First Amendment Walks into a Bar: Trademark Protection and Free
Speech, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 381, 382 (2016); see also Ned Snow, Free Speech & Disparaging
Trademarks, 55 BOSTON COLLEGE L. REV. 1639 (2016).
12
13
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provision infringes the First Amendment for the same reason: It
too disfavors certain ideas.18
The facts of the case were simple — Erik Brunetti is an artist and
entrepreneur who developed a clothing line under the brand name FUCT. 19
According to Brunetti, the name is pronounced as four sepate letters: F-U-C-T.20
However, as the Court noted: “But you might read it differently and, if so, you
would hardly be alone. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 5 (describing the brand name as ‘the
equivalent of [the] past participle form of a well-known word of profanity’).”21
Relying on the prohibitions on registration of immoral or scandalous marks, the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) rejected Brunetti’s application.22
Section 1052(a) prohibits registration of a mark that “[c]onsists of or
comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter.”23 The Court
acknowledged that the PTO interprets this bar as a “unitary provision,” rather
than treating the two adjectives as separate prohibitions.24 This point proves
important given the justices’ eventual split on a possible narrowing
interpretation. Justice Kagan noted that the standard focuses on “whether a
‘substantial composite of the general public’ would find the mark ‘shocking to
the sense of truth, decency, or propriety’; ‘giving offense to the conscience or
moral feelings’; ‘calling out for condemnation’; ‘disgraceful’; ‘offensive’;
‘disreputable’; or ‘vulgar.’”25
The Brunetti application was reviewed and rejected by both the PTO
examining attorney and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. The stated
reasons for these decisions highlight the content discrimination problem with
the bar — the examining attorney deemed “FUCT” to be “a total vulgar” mark
and the Board observed that the mark was “highly offensive,” “vulgar,” with
“decidedly negative sexual connotations.”26 Because it appeared in a context of
“extreme nihilism,” the Board believed it delivered a message of “misogyny,
depravity, [and] violence.”27 On appeal, the Federal Circuit held the prohibition
violated the First Amendment, and the Supreme Court then granted certiorari.28

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 2298.
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2298.
Id. (quoting In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).
Id. (quoting the record below) (alterations in original).
Id. (quoting the record below) (alterations in original).
Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 782 (2019)
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Justice Kagan began her analysis by noting that the Court in Tam struck down
the Lanham Act’s ban on registering disparaging marks as a violation of the First
Amendment.29 As she pointed out, “all the Justices agreed on two propositions.
First, if a trademark registration bar is viewpoint-based, it is unconstitutional.
And second, the disparagement bar was viewpoint-based.”30 The Court “could
not agree on the overall framework for deciding the case. (In particular, no
majority emerged to resolve whether a Lanham Act bar is a condition on a
government benefit or a simple restriction on speech.).”31
The heart of the matter, then, becomes whether “the ‘immoral or scandalous’
criterion in the Lanham Act [is] viewpoint-neutral or viewpoint-based. . . [i]t is
viewpoint-based.”32 Justice Kagan cited a long string of definitions and
interpretations demonstrating that the bar was designed to reject the proposed
trademark based on governmental disapproval of the messages being conveyed.33
For example, the Court pointed out that the marks “YOU CAN’T SPELL
HEALTHCARE WITHOUT THC” for pain-relief medication and “KO
KANE” for beverages were rejected, while the marks “D.A.R.E. TO RESIST
DRUGS AND VIOLENCE” and “SAY NO TO DRUGS—REALITY IS THE
BEST TRIP IN LIFE” were approved.34
As the Court noted, the Government essentially conceded that the Lanham
Act’s language and the PTO’s prior interpretations disfavored certain ideas based
on content, but urged the Court to consider the statute’s susceptibility to a

29
30
31

32
33
34

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 2299 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2298-99. The opinion elaborated on the areas of agreement as follows:
The Justices thus found common ground in a core postulate of free speech
law: The government may not discriminate against speech based on the
ideas or opinions it conveys. In Justice Kennedy’s explanation, the
disparagement bar allowed a trademark owner to register a mark if it was
“positive” about a person, but not if it was “derogatory.” That was the
“essence of viewpoint discrimination,” he continued, because “[t]he law
thus reflects the Government’s disapproval of a subset of messages it finds
offensive.” Justice [Alito] emphasized that the statute “denie[d] registration
to any mark” whose disparaging message was “offensive to a substantial
percentage of the members of any group.” The bar thus violated the
“bedrock First Amendment principle” that the government cannot
discriminate against “ideas that offend.” Slightly different explanations,
then, but a shared conclusion: Viewpoint discrimination doomed the
disparagement bar.
Id. at 2299 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2299–300.
Id. at 2300 (citations omitted).
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limiting construction that would remove the viewpoint discrimination.35 This
interpretation would focus upon the mode of expression, limiting the bar to
vulgar, lewd, sexually explicit, or profane words, regardless of the message being
conveyed.36 The Court rejected this solution:
This Court, of course, may interpret “ambiguous statutory
language” to “avoid serious constitutional doubts.” But that
canon of construction applies only when ambiguity exists. “We
will not rewrite a law to conform it to constitutional
requirements.” So even assuming the Government’s reading
would eliminate First Amendment problems, we may adopt it
only if we can see it in the statutory language. And we cannot.
The “immoral or scandalous” bar stretches far beyond the
Government’s proposed construction. The statute as written
does not draw the line at lewd, sexually explicit, or profane
marks. Nor does it refer only to marks whose “mode of
expression,” independent of viewpoint, is particularly offensive.
It covers the universe of immoral or scandalous—or (to use
some PTO synonyms) offensive or disreputable—material.
Whether or not lewd or profane. Whether the scandal and
immorality comes from mode or instead from viewpoint. To cut
the statute off where the Government urges is not to interpret
the statute Congress enacted, but to fashion a new one.37
Having rejected the proposal for a limiting construction, the majority readily
found the statute unconstitutional. The Court rejected the Government’s last
grasp at an argument—that the provision should only be struck down as applied
in this case, given that it might have some lawful applications in other contexts:
“this Court has never applied that kind of analysis to a viewpoint-discriminatory
law.”38 Moreover, the Court deemed the Lanham Act bar to be overbroad:
“There are a great many immoral and scandalous ideas in the world (even more
than there are swearwords), and the Lanham Act covers them all. It therefore
violates the First Amendment.”39
Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion designed to make two foundational
points. First, he reaffirmed a broad concept of free speech:

35
36
37
38
39

Id. at 2301.
Id.
Id. at 2301-02 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2302.
Id.
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Viewpoint discrimination is poison to a free society. But in many
countries with constitutions or legal traditions that claim to
protect freedom of speech, serious viewpoint discrimination is
now tolerated, and such discrimination has become increasingly
prevalent in this country. At a time when free speech is under
attack, it is especially important for this Court to remain firm on
the principle that the First Amendment does not tolerate
viewpoint discrimination. We reaffirm that principle today.40
Second, he noted that Congress could draft a narrowly tailored statute barring
the registration of vulgar marks, such as the one in this case, “that play no real
part in the expression of ideas. . . The term suggested by that mark is not needed
to express any idea and, in fact, as commonly used today, generally signifies
nothing except emotion and a severely limited vocabulary. The registration of
such marks serves only to further coarsen our popular culture.”41
Chief Justice Roberts, concurring in part and dissenting in part, also made
two fundamental points.42 First, he agreed with the majority that the ban on
registering an immoral mark is not susceptible to a narrowing construction, but
believed that such a construction could be given to the prohibition on scandalous
marks. Second, he stated that “[t]he First Amendment protects the freedom of
speech; it does not require the Government to give aid and comfort to those
using obscene, vulgar, and profane modes of expression.”43
Justice Breyer also concurred in part and dissented in part.44 Like the Chief
Justice, he agreed with Justice Sotomayor that the “scandalous” bar could be
interpreted to “apply only to certain highly ‘vulgar’ or ‘obscene’ modes of
expression.”45 Justice Breyer believes that First Amendment cases should be
viewed primarily from a balancing approach, rather than a categorical one.
Categorical approaches use what he views as rigid frameworks to analyze each
case.46 He would focus on whether the restriction in question “wor[ks] harm to
First Amendment interests that is disproportionate in light of the relevant
regulatory objectives?”47 Applying this rubric, Justice Breyer agreed with Justice
Sotomayor’s view that the “scandalous” bar is constitutional if applied only to
vulgar or obscene modes of expression:

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Id. at 2302-03 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2303.
Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2303-04.
Id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 2304-05.
Id. at 2306 (citations omitted).
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How much harm to First Amendment interests does a bar on
registering highly vulgar or obscene trademarks work? Not
much. The statute leaves businesses free to use highly vulgar or
obscene words on their products, and even to use such words
directly next to other registered marks. Indeed, a business owner
might even use a vulgar word as a trademark, provided that he
or she is willing to forgo the benefits of registration.48
Finally, Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part, expressing concern about the lack of an enforceable ban on any vulgar
words or images: “The Court’s decision today will beget unfortunate results.
With the Lanham Act’s scandalous-marks provision. . . struck down as
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, the Government will have no
statutory basis to refuse (and thus no choice but to begin) registering marks
containing the most vulgar, profane, or obscene words and images imaginable.”49
In her view, joined by three other justices, the Lanham Act’s prohibition could
be construed to preclude “only obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity. Such a
narrowing construction would save that duly enacted legislative text by rendering
it a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral restriction on speech that is permissible in the
context of a beneficial governmental initiative like the trademark-registration
system.”50 Importantly, her approach received support from Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Breyer, and (at least implicitly) from Justice Alito.51
Elaborating on her view, Justice Sotomayor acknowledged and agreed with
the majority that the ban on immoral marks is unconstitutional, as it “clearly
connotes a preference for ‘rectitude and morality’ over its opposite.”52 The term
“scandalous,” however, is ambiguous, and “can be read broadly (to cover both
offensive ideas and offensive manners of expressing ideas), or it can be read
narrowly (to cover only offensive modes of expression).”53 This, in her view,
makes it possible to have a limiting construction on the scope of the ban. This
approach is buttressed, she contends, by the use of three different prohibitions
in section 1052(a):
With marks that are offensive because they are disparaging and
marks that are offensive because they are immoral already

48
49
50
51
52
53

Id.
Id. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
See id. at 2302–04.
Id. at 2309 (citation omitted).
Id.
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covered, what work did Congress intend for “scandalous” to do?
A logical answer is that Congress meant for “scandalous” to
target a third and distinct type of offensiveness: offensiveness in
the mode of communication rather than the idea. The other two
words cover marks that are offensive because of the ideas they
express; the “scandalous” clause covers marks that are offensive
because of the mode of expression, apart from any particular
message or idea.54
IV.

FASHIONING A CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE STATUTE

Now that the Supreme Court has struck down the Lanham Act prohibitions
on registering disparaging, scandalous, and immoral marks, there is no
constitutionally valid prohibition on the registration of offensive or scandalous
trademarks whatsoever — regardless of how these might be defined. The
question in light of Tam and Brunetti is whether Congress can enact a newly
revised prohibition without violating the First Amendment. Commentators note
that there is a compelling need for a limit on content that can be registered as a
federal trademark.55
Clues can be found in the justices’ opinions, particularly in Brunetti. Justice
Kagan’s majority opinion rejected the proposal to give a limiting construction in
the following statement:
The statute as written does not draw the line at lewd, sexually
explicit, or profane marks. Nor does it refer only to marks whose
“mode of expression,” independent of viewpoint, is particularly
offensive. It covers the universe of immoral or scandalous—or
(to use some PTO synonyms) offensive or disreputable—
material. Whether or not lewd or profane. Whether the scandal
and immorality comes from mode or instead from viewpoint. To
cut the statute off where the Government urges is not to
interpret the statute Congress enacted, but to fashion a new
one.56
This language is instructive towards fashioning a statute that might pass
constitutional muster. In effect, to be permissible under the First Amendment,
the prohibition must focus on the mode of expression — the use of particular

Id. at 2310.
See, e.g., Ilhyung Lee, Tam Through the Lens of Brunetti: THE SLANTS, FUCT, 69 EMORY
L.J. ONLINE 2001 (2019).
56 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2301-02 (citation omitted).
54
55
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words or images that are lewd, profane, or sexually explicit — rather than on the
meaning, viewpoint, or message being conveyed by the mark.
Similarly, Justice Alito stated the following in his concurring opinion:
Our decision does not prevent Congress from adopting a more
carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks
containing vulgar terms that play no real part in the expression of ideas.
The particular mark in question in this case could be denied
registration under such a statute. The term suggested by that
mark is not needed to express any idea and, in fact, as commonly
used today, generally signifies nothing except emotion and a
severely limited vocabulary. The registration of such marks
serves only to further coarsen our popular culture.57
Chief Justice Roberts, concurring in part and dissenting in part, contended
that a narrowing construction could be given to the prohibition on scandalous
marks.58 Further, he stated that “[t]he First Amendment protects the freedom of
speech; it does not require the Government to give aid and comfort to those
using obscene, vulgar, and profane modes of expression.”59
Justice Breyer also agreed with Justice Sotomayor that “we should interpret
the word ‘scandalous’ in the present statute to refer only to certain highly ‘vulgar’
or ‘obscene’ modes of expression.”60 If applied only to vulgar or obscene modes
of expression, he viewed the harm to First Amendment interests to be minimal.
Elaborating on this point, he noted that:
[T]he field at issue here, trademark law, is a highly regulated one
with a specialized mission: to “hel[p] consumers identify goods
and services that they wish to purchase, as well as those they want
to avoid.” As I have noted, that mission, by its very nature,
requires the Government to impose limitations on speech. . .
Now consider, by way of contrast, the Government’s interests in
barring the registration of highly vulgar or obscene trademarks. For
one thing, when the Government registers a mark, it is
necessarily “involv[ed] in promoting” that mark. The
Government has at least a reasonable interest in ensuring that it
is not involved in promoting highly vulgar or obscene speech,

Id. at 2303 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59 Id. at 2303-04 (emphasis added).
60 Id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal citations
omitted).
57
58
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and that it will not be associated with such speech. For another,
scientific evidence suggests that certain highly vulgar words have
a physiological and emotional impact that makes them different
in kind from most other words.61
Importantly for purposes of this discussion, Justice Breyer observed that the
list of offensive terms:
[H]as changed over time: In the last few centuries, the list has
evolved away from words of religious disrespect and toward
words that are sexually explicit or that crudely describe bodily
functions. And the list of swear words may be evolving yet again,
perhaps in the direction of including race-based epithets.62
Finally, he noted that the government may have an interest in preventing highly
vulgar or obscene words from being displayed in public spaces and retail
establishments where children are likely to be present.63
In Justice Sotomayor’s view, the Lanham Act’s prohibition could be
construed to preclude “only obscenity, vulgarity, and profanity. Such a narrowing
construction would save that duly enacted legislative text by rendering it a
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral restriction on speech, which is permissible in the
context of a beneficial governmental initiative like the trademark-registration
system.”64 In her view, the prohibition on immoral or scandalous marks should
be viewed as “holding a distinct, nonredundant meaning, with ‘immoral’ covering
marks that are offensive because they transgress social norms, and ‘scandalous’
covering marks that are offensive because of the mode in which they are
expressed.”65
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion does offer a general roadmap for how a revised
statute might be framed to meet constitutional concerns — albeit by Congress
rather than through a limiting construction from the Court. The revised statute,
perhaps in combination with PTO guidance, would be aimed solely at offensive
modes of expression: obscenity, vulgarity, or profanity. Obscenity can be

Id. at 2306-07 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 2307 (citations omitted).
63 Id. (citing Denver Area Ed. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
743 (1996) (plurality opinion) (governmental interest in “protec[ting] children from exposure
to patently offensive sex-related material” (alteration in original)); Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (“interest in the well-being of its youth”).
64 Id. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
65 Id. at 2311.
61
62
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delineated by the standard set forth in Miller v. California.66 The Miller test requires
three elements to deem material as obscene:
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary
community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.”67
This well-established three-part test can be incorporated into any prohibition on
registration of obscene marks.
Vulgarity or profanity would be limited to a “small group of lewd words or
‘swear’ words that cause a visceral reaction, that are not commonly used around
children, and that are prohibited in comparable settings.”68 Justice Sotomayor
cites a variety of provisions that cover similar content in contexts such as radio
broadcasts and Coast Guard regulations.69 As she notes, “[e]veryone can think
of a small number of words (including the apparent homonym of Brunetti’s
mark) that would. . . plainly qualify.”70
Would Justice Sotomayor’s proposed language satisfy the Brunetti majority’s
concerns if enacted though a combination of legislation and PTO action? The
key is whether such a restriction could be deemed content-neutral:
While the line between viewpoint-based and viewpoint-neutral
content discrimination can be “slippery,” it is in any event clear
that a regulation is not viewpoint discriminatory (or even content
discriminatory) simply because it has an “incidental effect” on a

See 413 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1973).
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
68 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2311 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69 See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (prohibiting “obscene, indecent, or profane language” in
radio communications); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 746, 746 n.22 (1978)
(opinion of Stevens, J.) (discussing a regulator’s monologue containing various “four-letter
words”); 46 C.F.R. § 67.117(b)(3) (2018) (Coast Guard regulation prohibiting vessel names
involving “obscene, indecent, or profane language, or . . . racial or ethnic epithets”); see also
Leslie G. Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1416–17, 1417 n.432
(2001) (citing one state agency’s list of words).
70 See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2311.
66
67
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certain subset of views. Some people, for example, may have the
viewpoint that society should be more sexually liberated and feel
that they cannot express that view sufficiently without the use of
pornographic words or images. That does not automatically
make a restriction on pornography into viewpoint
discrimination, despite the fact that such a restriction limits
communicating one’s views on sexual liberation in that way.71
Further, she cites the example of fighting words, which “are categorically
excluded from the protection of the First Amendment not because they have no
content or express no viewpoint (often quite the opposite), but because their
content embodies a particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of
expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey.”72
The most difficult free speech case to distinguish, as Justice Sotomayor’s
opinion recognizes,73 is Cohen v. California,74 where the Supreme Court struck
down the criminal conviction for disturbing the peace of a person wearing a
jacket with the words “Fuck the Draft” whilst walking the corridor of a
courthouse. She contrasts this criminal law context with the federal regulatory
setting in which the trademark ban would be enforced.75 First she notes that
trademark rights:
[A]rise through use, not registration. Regardless of whether a
trademark is registered, it can be used, owned, and enforced
against would-be infringers. . . Registration, in short, is a helpful
system, but it is one that the Government is under no obligation
to establish and that is collateral to the existence and use of
trademarks themselves.76
She then observes that the Court has treated these types of governmental
initiatives as one of two categories. The first is a limited public (or nonpublic)
forum, such as a program providing funds to recognized student groups or a
program allowing approved charitable organizations to solicit donations from

71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at 2313 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2314 (citations and quotations omitted).
Id. at 2314–15.
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2314–15.
Id. at 2316 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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federal employees.77 The second involves a government program or subsidy,
such as a program providing funds to legal services organizations or a grant
program for the arts.78
In these contexts, she notes, “[r]egardless of the finer distinctions between
these labels, reasonable, viewpoint-neutral content discrimination is generally
permissible under either framework.”79 Applying this categorical analysis to the
present case, she contends:
Whichever label one chooses here, the federal system of
trademark registration fits: It is, in essence, an opportunity to
include one’s trademark on a list and thereby secure the ancillary
benefits that come with registration. Just as in the limited-forum
and government-program cases, some speakers benefit, but no
speakers are harmed. Brunetti, for example, can use, own, and
enforce his mark regardless of whether it has been registered.
Whether he may register his mark can therefore turn on
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral content regulations.80
This leads to the heart of Justice Sotomayor’s view on the scope of permissible
regulation of offensive trademarks: “[p]rohibiting the registration of obscene,
profane, or vulgar marks qualifies as reasonable, viewpoint-neutral, contentbased regulation.”81 The Government has a legitimate interest to not associate
itself with this type of speech.82
In assessing the new type of trademark statute that could pass constitutional
muster after Tam and Brunetti, it is important to see how the majority addressed
the suggestion that the “scandalous” bar could be given a narrowing
interpretation. Justice Kagan’s majority opinion addressed how to interpret this
broad term:

77 Id. (citing Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 669–670, 682 (2010) (evaluating a program providing funds to
recognized student groups); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
823–824, 829–830 (1995) (same); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 790–791, 799–801, 806 (1985) (program allowing approved charitable organizations
to solicit donations from federal employees)).
78 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2316 (citing Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536, 543–
544 (2001) (program providing funds to legal services organizations); Nat’l Endowment for
Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 573, 585–587 (1998) (grant program for the arts)).
79 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2316-17 (citing Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 679; Velazquez, 531
U.S. at 543–544, 548–549; Ysursa v. Pocatello Ed. Ass’n., 555 U.S. 353, 355 (2009)).
80 Id. at 2317.
81 Id.
82 Id. (citing Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 359–360; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809).
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Remember that the dictionaries define it to mean offensive,
disreputable, exciting reprobation, and so forth. Even if hived
off from “immoral” marks, the category of scandalous marks
thus includes both marks that offend by the ideas they convey and
marks that offend by their mode of expression. And its coverage
of the former means that it discriminates based on viewpoint.
We say nothing at all about a statute that covers only the latter
— or, in the Government’s more concrete description, a statute
limited to lewd, sexually explicit, and profane marks.83
In viewing categories of unprotected speech, other “modes of expression,
such as fighting words or extremely loud noises, could also be called shocking or
offensive in certain contexts, but it is hard to see how they would apply in the
context of a trademark.”84 Justice Sotomayor noted that obscenity can clearly be
prohibited, a proposition that all of the justices presumably agree with: “Of
course, obscenity itself is subject to a longstanding exception to First
Amendment protection, so it is proscribable in any event.”85 Addressing
vulgarity and profanity, on the other hand, she noted that “they are not subject
to any such exception, and a regulation like § 1052(a)’s ban on the registration of
scandalous marks is not ‘justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech’ in the way that a simple regulation of time, place, or manner
is.”86
Significantly, Justice Sotomayor highlighted one particular word for specific
discussion:
There is at least one particularly egregious racial epithet that
would fit this description as well. While Matal v. Tam removed a
statutory basis to deny the registration of racial epithets in
general, the Government represented at oral argument that it is
holding in abeyance trademark applications that use that
particular epithet. As a result of today’s ruling, the Government
will now presumably be compelled to register marks containing
that epithet as well rather than treating it as a “scandalous” form
of profanity under § 1052(a).87

83 Id. at 2302 n.* (internal citation omitted). She also notes that “[n]or do we say anything
about how to evaluate viewpoint-neutral restrictions on trademark registration—because the
“scandalous” bar (whether or not attached to the “immoral” bar) is not one.” Id. (internal
citation omitted).
84 Id. at 2311 n.3 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
85 Id. at 2314 n.6 (citing Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791 (2011)).
86 Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, (1989) (emphasis deleted)).
87 Id. at 2312 n.5 (citations omitted).
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Justice Sotomayor noted that treating regulations on obscene, vulgar, and
profane content “as viewpoint discrimination would upend decades of
precedent.”88
Applying the suggestions for a legislative rewrite that would be consistent
with both the majority and partial dissents in Brunetti, along with the unanimous
Court in Tam, the following principles should govern the drafting process. First,
the prohibition must be viewpoint neutral. It cannot prohibit terms simply
because they offend some groups or express a viewpoint that some find
repulsive. Second, the prohibition must focus on the mode of expression, not on
the message being conveyed. Third, the mode of expression must fit within
constitutionally recognized boundaries in the same or similar contexts. Thus, the
trademark should be reasonably considered defamatory, obscene, or indecent in
order to be barred from registration.
Defamatory speech is given limited protection, depending on the statement’s
target and the level of public concern in its content. The analysis is governed by
the New York Times v. Sullivan89 line of cases, which gives public figures and
officials less protection from defamation than private individuals, and which
gives more protection to speech concerning public matters than to that of private
interest. As previously noted, obscenity can be prohibited completely, so long as
it satisfies the Miller v. California test.90
Important lessons can be drawn from the case of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.91
In that 1978 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s prohibition on the
use of indecent material—specifically the “seven dirty words” in that case.92
Those words were “shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits.”93
Importantly, the Court noted that “[i]n this case it is undisputed that the content
of Pacifica’s broadcast was “vulgar,” “offensive,” and “shocking.” Because
content of that character is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection

88 Id. at 2314. She further noted: “It would also risk destabilizing government practice in a
number of other contexts. Governments regulate vulgarity and profanity, for example, on cityowned buses and billboards, on registered vessels, and at school events.” Id. at 2314 n.7 (citing
Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 989 F. Supp. 2d 182, 183 (D. Mass.
2013); 46 C.F.R. § 67.117(b)(3) (pertinent Coast Guard regulations); Bethel School Dist. No.
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–678, 685 (1986)).
89 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For commentary on this line of cases, see, e.g., Harry Kalven Jr.,
The New York Times Case: A Note on “the Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT.
REV. 191 (1964); Rodney Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of
Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1983); 2 FOWLER HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 5.0-.30
(2d ed. 1986). See also Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 782, 818 (1986).
90 See 413 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1973).
91 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
92 Id.
93 Appendix to Opinion of Court at 751, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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under all circumstances, we must consider its context in order to determine
whether the Commission’s action was constitutionally permissible.”94
Although many have criticized this decision,95 it probably expresses the
sensibilities of most Americans — that these words should not be part of
ordinary conversation directed at broad audiences, particularly when children are
likely to be present. As the Court reiterated in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,96
“speech that is ‘“vulgar,” “offensive,” and “shocking”‘ is ‘not entitled to absolute
constitutional protection under all circumstances.’” The Pacifica Court defended
and justified the rule based on the intrusiveness of the message and the context
of the narrow broadcast spectrum at the time.97 Since the case was decided, the
spectrum scarcity rationale has weakened considerably, but the intrusiveness
argument still holds some weight.
Arguably, the same can arguably be said about trademarks. Trademarks are
intrusive in both the marketplace and in the media. Trademarks appear
prominently on billboards, in storefronts, on webpages, on clothing and
accessories, and in all forms of media, including broadcast, cable, streaming,
satellite, and internet. If anything, they are more pervasive than entertainment
programming that might cross the indecency line.
Moreover, like broadcast spectrum licenses, a trademark registration gives the
recipient a variety of governmentally granted benefits not enjoyed by the general
public or those who do not hold registered trademarks. The government can
thus impose some restrictions on these recipients, so long as it does so on a
viewpoint-neutral basis.
Implementing this analysis, a proposed amendment to the Lanham Act might
state:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registra-tion
on the principal register on account of its nature unless it—
(a) Consists of or comprises obscene, vulgar, and profane
matter. . .98

438 U.S. at 747-48.
See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45
DUKE L.J. 1131, 1136 (1996) (criticizing multiple arguments for restricting violent and
indecent television broadcasts); Coileen E. O’Connor, American Horror Story: The FCC’s Chilling
Indecency Policy, 33 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 531, 545 (2019) (explaining how
“there is no longer any justification for imposing elevated speech restrictions on broadcast
television.” Id.).
96 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747).
97 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
98 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012) (emphasis added to signal proposed amended language by
the author).
94
95
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The contours of this restriction could then be developed by the PTO, which
could issue guidance regarding the types of marks whose mode of expression
would run afoul of this new statute.99
The prohibition on obscene marks could follow the Miller test, and the
potential prohibition on indecent marks could follow the Pacifica analysis. The
indecency standard can and does extend beyond the “seven dirty words,”
including, for example, indecent imagery. A particular challenge is posed by
racially derogatory marks, with the N-word being the most prominent example.
As of this writing, nine trademarks have been registered making use of a word
substantially similar to it.100 The holding in Tam seems to preclude a prohibition
of racial slurs, leaving a possible argument that the N-word is somehow different
from other racial slurs. It seems unlikely that a majority of the Court would
accept this distinction in light of Tam, but the PTO could issues a prohibition on
it under the indecency umbrella, which could then be tested in the courts.
Crucially, any statutory or PTO-promulgated prohibition should specifically
indicate that it is severable from any other prohibition, so that if any one
prohibition is struck down, the remaining bars would still be in effect.
In sum, any new prohibition enacted by Congress would need to be focused
on the mode of expression, rather than on the message conveyed. A revised
Lanham Act provision could focus on obscene, vulgar, and profane words and
images. Such a provision, along with implementing guidance from the Patent and
Trademark Office, could well be deemed a permissible and content-neutral
regulation on which marks gain the benefit of federal trademark registration.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court’s decisions in Tam and Brunetti struck down statutory
provisions that had limited trademark registrations of offensive content for over
seventy years. The Brunetti majority, for reasons which were understandable given
the history of how the prohibition was interpreted, refused to apply a limiting
construction. Nonetheless, the justices’ opinions provide a roadmap for a revised
statute that can pass constitutional muster. Thus, Congress could amend the

99 A further prohibition on defamatory marks would likely need to hew closely to the
categories of protected and unprotected speech found in the defamation case law, as noted
previously. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81. A full discussion of such a provision is
beyond the scope of this article.
100 These marks are: REAL MAN—REAL NIGGA GOOD WOMAN—BAD BITCH,
Registration No. 88,419,152; WHITE NIGGA, No. 88,156,862; REAL NIGGAS,
Registration No. 88,540,893; NIGGA, Registration No. 87,507,483, 87,496,454,87,507,414,
87,499,736; ROTTONS- RICH OFF THOUGHTS THAT OTHER NIGGAS SAID,
Registration No. 87,483,653; MUDD NIGGA$, Registration No. 87,862,949.
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Lanham Act to include a narrowly tailored prohibition on marks employing a
mode of expression that can be lawfully barred under the First Amendment. The
statute could preclude the registration of obscene, vulgar, and profane marks.
Further, the provision could authorize the Patent and Trademark Office to
prescribe regulations to implement this ban in a manner that would constitute a
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral restriction on speech in the context of a
governmentally issued registration scheme.
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